concerning the status of EU citizens affected by Brexit and differentiated citizenship arrangements (a scala civium) and argue that there is room for institutional innovation in the domain of citizenship.
The discussion is structured as follows. In section II, I deploy an analytical lens in order to theorise citizenship and its governance in the EU and to differentiate national citizenship from EU citizenship. Section III discusses the domicile paradigm which features at the top of the normative agenda for the development of EU citizenship and argues that it would have a limited applicability to citizenship rights post-Brexit. The advantages and disadvantages of possible citizenship or permanent residence templates at national level are explored in section IV. Section V presents, and defends, the proposal for a special EU protected citizen status for both EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in other Member States while section VI contains the concluding remarks.
II. Isolating Questions of Concept
Engaging in institutional design thinking and contemplating citizenship templates post-Brexit requires a prior attention to the concepts of national citizenship and European Union citizenship. The European Union has had a multi-layered citizenship regime, within which national, subnational, supranational citizenships have been nested and interlocked (for early accounts see Meehan, 1993; Preuss, 1995; Weiler, 1995; Kostakopoulou, 1996; O'Leary, 1996; de Burca, 1996; Wiener and Della Sala, 1997) . The Brexit outcome of the referendum has brought forth their possible disentanglement. In this section, I deploy an analytical lens in order to examine national and European Union citizenships and to clarify their differences.
This is envisaged to provide the background for discussing below how these citizenships could be disentangled and the possible absorption of complex citizenship by national citizenship. Although such a change would be a subtraction and subtractions unavoidably lead to reduced possibilities, I will intentionally refrain from perceiving Brexit as an indicator of the resilience of national citizenship and, accordingly, of the alleged fragility of EU citizenship and, more generally speaking, of forms of postnational citizenship.
European Union citizenship has been conditioned on either the possession or the acquisition of national citizenship since its formal establishment by the Treaty on European Union (1 November 1993). Although it is formally a derivative citizenship (i.e., only nationals of the Member States can be EU citizens), it differs from national citizenship in a number of ways. The most important difference is that Union citizenship is premised on mobility, that is, on national border crossings and on the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of nationality. 11 National citizenship, on the other hand, has been a sedentary status.
Owing to its close links with territorially bound communities organised as nation-states, national citizenship has been internally inclusive and externally exclusive (Goodin, 1996; Baubock, 2007 ). An inclusive 'we', that is, a public consisting of national and naturalised citizens, is juxtaposed to others, that is, to foreigners or non-nationals. So, whereas at the national level heterogeneity or ethnic diversity has been used as a justification for the exclusion of racial, ethnic and national minorities and for measures designed to promote national cohesion, for the European Union it is a source of strength and unity. Heterogeneity is thus seen to be a premise for co-existence, connectivity and the development of multifarious associative relations.
In addition, whereas national citizenship needs socially legitimating myths, 'big ideas', rituals and symbols in order to perform its integrative functions, EU citizenship is a juridico-political institution. It has not has not established a sacrificial culture and has not turned domestic societies into societies of control and surveillance. It has merely conferred rights directly on Union citizens which are enforceable before national as well as European Union courts. More importantly, it has done so without eroding national cultures. By so doing, it has confirmed Wildavsky's (1987, p. 11 ) observation that it is wrong to believe that inconsistent cultures do not (-or cannot) cohere (see also Kratochwil, 2001) . Of course, the exercise of EU citizenship rights is bound to rub off against the settled powers of the state and national administrative authorities thereby causing irritations and frictions. And irritations provoke criticism and, on occasions, resistance, but neither states nor cultures have been eroded by it. Accordingly, workers, work-seekers, self-employed persons, students, pensioners, persons of independent means, family members of Union citizens, service recipients and posted workers, all have been encouraged to exercise their free movement rights and, through their citizenship practices (Wiener, 1998; Magnette, 2005) , they have formed direct bonds with the European Union.
12
A broader, more cosmopolitan political community has thus emerged in the European setting due to institutional efforts to overcome the disabilities of 'alienage' and national discriminatory and restrictive practices. Occupational barriers anchored on nationality, national protectionism and even unnecessary obstacles to free movement and residence have been progressively removed so that 'outsiders' can become 'insiders' and rightful participants in the host societies. This radical normative change 13 has enriched socio-political life and has revealed the admirable working of the logic of equality. 
III. Isolating Normative Questions and Desirable Reforms
In section II I examined the conceptual issues surrounding national and European Union citizenships and discussed their differences. (Preuss, 1995; Soysal 1995; Kostakopoulou, 1996 Kostakopoulou, , 2001 Shaw, 1997; Soysal, 1995; Maas, 2007; Kochenov and Plender 2012; Tonkiss, 2013; but compare Olsen, 2012 By contrasting nature with society, he argued that societal unification is based on connecting individuals and on their activities (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010) . Understanding, love and common work make individuals societal members; they come to recognise concrete others as 'fellow sociates'. According to Simmel (1923) , each social element (each individual) is interwoven with the life and activities of every other, and this produces the external framework of society.
The relating or connexive process of society creates communities of 'concern and engagement' (Kostakopoulou, 1996; 2001) . This has important implications for national citizenship and identity since it severs the link between national communities and the enjoyment of political rights. By transcending the ordering process of society on which national statist communities have been built, the future development of EU citizenship could include the grant of voting rights in national parliamentary elections to EU citizens, the formation of transnational political parties and the revision of the restrictive procedural requirements surrounding the European Citizens' Initiative. 16 Being together in welfare and in a common political life in a common European space would also require the recognition of social rights and duties (Ferrera, 2009; Maas, 2014) and the establishment of a European solidarity fund and of a minimum basic income allowance. 17 Additional reforms might include the strengthening of the links between European institutions and the European civil society, 18 the more effective protection of national and ethnic minorities (Carrera, 2014) , and coordinated action to tackle obstacles to the family reunification of EU citizens and the resurgence of discrimination, xenophobia and racism in austerity-ridden Europe. All these reforms would enhance democratic participation and provide opportunities for the empowerment of citizens.
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What should be mentioned here is that, although the existing political climate might not be receptive to a transformative European Union citizenship agenda, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that existing institutional limitations and non-receptive political environments tend to serve as both barriers and invitations to further institutional reform. In this respect, the subsequent discussion on citizenship templates should not be taken to imply that the normative agenda for the development of EU citizenship should be forgotten and that the domicile paradigm of EU citizenship serves no use.
IV. The Law of the Excluded Middle: Opening the Naturalisation Gates Or Permanent Residence
Although the normative proposals for the development of EU citizenship continue to inspire the activities of non-governmental organisations and the European civil society, 20 if an intergovernmental solution to the position of former EU citizens is sought during the Brexit negotiations, EU citizens who are resident in the UK and UK nationals resident in other Member States will be offered either permanent leave to remain or the option of applying for national citizenship. 21 In fact, given that the UK and other Member States have viewed EU citizenship as interfering with their right to treat the holders of that citizenship as foreigners (Guild, 2014, p. 424) , Brexit might give rise to claims to make the determination of the status of EU citizens 'a purely internal situation' triggering the application of domestic procedures and laws.
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The procedure of applying for permanent residence or indefinite leave to remain is one of them. The latter entails the freedom to enter, live and work the country of residence either indefinitely or initially for a prescribed period of time (e.g., for ten years in France and five years in Italy), but it can also be revoked in certain circumstances. In order for one to travel outside the country of residence, (s)he would have to use his/her nationality passport
and to obtain a visa as a national of the country of origin. In several Member States, an individual cannot apply for national citizenship without acquiring first permanent residence. ' (Kohn, 1967; Smith, 1979) . According to its ethnic variant, the national community is premised on a shared ethnicity (ethnic nationalism) while civic nationalism relies on the commonalities of a common culture, history, language or values which non-nationals allegedly do not share (Breuilly, 1993; Miller 1996) .
Under the law of the excluded middle, fuzzy membership or shades of membership, such as denizenship, are not easily accommodated. Non-national residents can enter into associative relations but they are not formally included in the polity; they do not belong to the nation in a political or cultural sense. Complexity, hybrid identities and plural senses of belonging also disrupt the 'closed sets' of nationalist thinking (Gellner, 1964; Anderson, 1983) . This explains why EU citizenship has been perceived to be a rather dangerous supplement by nationalist parties and elites since its establishment at Maastricht. As States. At first sight, this might appear to be a simple, natural and feasible policy option. In reality, however, it has an inner complexity. I envisage two distinct possibilities here. First, it might be agreed that ordinary naturalisation procedures should apply to EU citizens. This would mean that they would have to satisfy all the requirements applying to third country nationals before being granted nationality by public authorities. into host societies and have been treated as rightful participants until now. It would deny their formal co-equality, with the exception of electoral rights at national parliamentary elections.
In addition, by creating a new positional relativity which would invite executive discretion, that is, the rejection of naturalisation applications from EU citizens who are deemed to be 'undesirable' or 'not yet ready for full inclusion and citizenship', the evolutionary sequence of naturalisation may look at first sight incorporative, but, in reality, is founded on distancing, separation and discrimination.
Because of these weaknesses, a different policy option might be preferable. The second option would be to exempt EU citizens from the normal naturalisation procedures and to facilitate their automatic or semi-automatic naturalisation by registration or by declaration of option. This would require an application for citizenship, but the process would be quick, more inclusive and non-discretionary. The UK and other Member States could in theory still require residency requirements and the absence of a criminal record. They could also differentiate between periods of residence. For instance, residence for a period exceeding ten years could prompt automatic naturalisation while shorter periods of residence would activate semi-automatic naturalisation. Naturalisation by declaration of option, on the other hand, would grant EU citizens the possibility of opting out from national citizenship if they wished to retain their citizenship of origin or not to compromise it in any other way.
Although there are important differences among the policy options mentioned above, the latter is more normatively defensible bearing in mind EU citizens' existing rightful membership. It does not assume the existence of deficiencies on the part of EU citizens which need to be overcome before their formal admission to the body politic. It recognises their 'enculturation' and effective links with society. More importantly, it avoids the temporalisation of their presence and the concomitant impression that their status is precarious because they are easily removable.
The policy of treating EU citizens as national citizens-to-be post-Brexit may appear to be feasible and appropriate from the standpoint of states, but it presupposes the reform of naturalisation laws in the Member States and conflicts with the rationale and status of European Union citizenship. The 'why' of it seems to be a preponderantly important question. In fact, as national citizenship is superimposed on EU citizenship, the latter's emphasis on non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and equalisation is being sidelined by a nation-centric logic which requires the conversion of 'aliens' into nationals via naturalisation, irrespective of the form this might take. But why should national citizenship be given methodological and political primacy since the rights EU citizens enjoy are derived from EU law and not from national laws? We need a more panoramic perspective. 'Seeing like a state' (Scott, 1998 ) is only a partial view.
Yet, critics might object, here, this is the road that politics has travelled thus far. In what follows, I show that this is not the case and that Union citizenship must be taken more seriously. More importantly, EU citizens are not invisible, 27 nor do they lead invisible lives.
The EU cannot delegate their protection to the Member States, nor can it rely on the generosity of spirit of national elites. It has a duty to protect its citizens post-Brexit and to reaffirm the normative and political weight of European Union citizenship.
V. The Alternative: A Special EU Protected Citizen Status
If the naturalisation of EU citizens in the Member State of residence following Brexit is not an appropriate policy option for the reasons outlined in the foregoing section, indefinite leave to remain in the UK or long-term residence in other Member States does not guarantee 27 N. 9 above.
security of residence and a panoply of rights and a domicile paradigm for EU citizenship is ruled out on the grounds of political pragmatism (section III above), one needs to search for alternatives. The search for a more suitable policy option cannot disregard the conceptual and juridico-political underpinnings of EU citizenship (section I above) and the purposes which its founders had in view.
Although the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome were viewed as an incipient form of EU citizenship by the European Commission in the early 1960s, 28 it is, nevertheless the case, that the formal establishment of EU citizenship at Maastricht is the outgrowth of the idea of granting 'EU nationals' 29 special rights in the Member State of residence. Indeed, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the debate on creating 'a People's Europe' was centred on the grant of special rights to EU nationals. 30 The special rights included the right to vote and to stand as candidates in local elections in the Member State of residence. This was considered to strengthen the feeling of belonging to a single legal community. Although concerns about the impact of this proposal on national citizenships were expressed by the Member States, brave thinking led to the adoption of a proposal which promoted equalisation (i.e., Community nationals had to be treated as if they were citizens of these states) rather than the opening up of the naturalisation gates. Indeed, this option prevailed because 'the emphasis should remain on residence rather than nationality' (European Commission, 1975, p. 32) . Considering the historical trajectory of EU citizenship and the role played by the idea 28 See 'the Free Movement of Workers in the Countries of the European Economic Community', Bull. EC 6/61, 5-10. See also W. Hallstein (1972 Hallstein ( [1969 , pp. 173-4).
29 This is a term used by the institutions of the European Community at that time. It did not denote an assumed common European nationality. 30 European Council (1985) , Adonnino Report, Bull. EC (Suppl) 7/85. For a detailed exposition of all the proposals, see Wiener (1998); Kostakopoulou (2001) and Maas (2007) .
of creating special rights (common European rights), it is only natural that EU citizenship remains a special status for EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in other Member States following Brexit.
Creating a special EU protected citizen status would ensure that all EU citizens affected by Brexit, that is, EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU, would continue to enjoy their EU citizenship rights and to be subject to the same conditions relating to their residence, employment and family reunification which apply to all other EU citizens. The only difference would be that this legal status would not be automatically It would merely maintain the legal effects of Union citizenship and ensure that the existing European Union citizenship space would not contract. Although the inspiration for such a special status is derived from the proposals on special rights that were on the European Community's policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s, it might be worth noting that there exists an institutional precedent in the field of citizenship and nationality law.
In UK nationality law, the special status of British protected persons was established by the British Nationality Act 1948 (in force on 1 January 1949). It was built on a pre- UK and UK nationals resident in the EU, who find themselves being transformed overnight from rightful subjects to mere objects of political negotiations between the EU and the UK.
VI. Conclusion
Legal norms should reflect social practices and citizens' lived realities. Brexit has brought forth a new political reality which threatens to undo legal rights and to unsettle EU citizens' lives. They have no power to contest this development and to object to their de-citizenisation Admittedly, this status is far from perfect in the light of the sophisticated normative agenda for the development of EU citizenship (section III above). In addition, it would effectively create a scala civium in the EU, that is, a system of graduated statuses. But, under the present circumstances, it would do justice to all those EU citizens who are enmeshed in their states of residence and have been sharing those states' burdens without any complaints for years or decades. It would also continue to reflect the fundamental status of EU citizenship and to safeguard the freedom of relating to, and co-operating with, human beings without discrimination on the ground of nationality.
